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I. INTRODUCTION 
The modern Right to Try movement can be traced back to Abigail 
Burroughs and the barriers she faced attempting to obtain an experimental 
drug in 2001.
1
 After Abigail exhausted all available conventional cancer 
treatments, her oncologist advised that she seek treatment using Erbitux,
2
 a 
then-experimental drug that specifically treated her type of cancer.
3
 
Her family initiated a significant media campaign and pressured drug 
manufacturers, as well as Congress, to give Abigail access to Erbitux.
4
 Despite 
meeting all of the requirements for access to an investigational drug under the 
FDA’s Compassionate Use Exception Doctrine, the FDA denied Abigail’s 
request.
5
 Abigail passed away on June 9, 2001 without ever having the 
opportunity to take Erbitux.
6
 
Abigail’s father, Frank Burroughs, founded the Abigail Alliance for Better 
Access to Developmental Drugs in response to the difficulty his daughter 
faced when seeking access to investigative products.
7
 Right to Try supporters 
have shifted their efforts away from federal courts and directed them toward 
state legislatures.
8
 There are a growing number of states that have passed 
Right to Try laws to give patients some hope in treating their terminal 
illnesses, but with AB 159’s veto, California does not join their ranks.
9
 
 
1. Sam Adriance, Fighting for the “Right to Try” Unapproved Drugs: Law As Persuasion, 124 YALE 
L.J. FORUM 148, 150 (Dec. 4, 2014).  
2. Letter from Dr. Karen D. Weiss, Dir. of the Office of Drug Evaluation VI, U.S. Food and Drug 
Admin., to Dr. Lily Lee, ImClone Systems, Inc. (Feb. 12, 2004) (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (granting FDA approval to ImClone Systems, Inc.’s drug Erbitux). 
3. Frank Burroughs, Our Story, ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, http://www.abigail-alliance.org/story.php (last 
visited July 14, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Press Release, 
Abigail Alliance, Abigail Alliance Supports ACCESS Act (Nov. 10, 2005) (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that Abigail was diagnosed with head and neck cancer). 
4. See Adriance, supra note 1, at 150 (stating that the Right to Try movement can be traced back to 
Abigail Burroughs). 
5. Peter Hart, Abigail Alliance Case Discussed: Balancing Study Drugs, Safety, UNIV. OF PITT.: 
UNIV. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.utimes.pitt.edu/?p=8605 (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). The criteria that must be met to permit use of any non-FDA approved drug includes: 
1) no comparable treatment alternative exists, 2) the drug is currently in clinical trials, and 3) the 
manufacturer of the investigational drug is seeking formal FDA approval. Id. In addition “the FDA is 
allowed to deny a compassionate-use request if the scientific evidence does not provide a reasonable basis 
to conclude that the drug may be effective for its intended use or if it would add an unreasonable and 
significant risk of illness.” Id. 
6. See Adriance, supra note 1, at 150.  
7. Burroughs, supra note 3 (describing the backstory of Abigail Alliance). 
8. Adriance, supra note 1, at 151. 
9. ”Right to Try” Legislation Passes Senate Unanimously, STONE SENTINEL (June 12, 2015), 
http://district28.cssrc.us/content/stone-sentinel-june-2015#1 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In California, the use of investigational drugs, biological products, and 
devices are subject to certain standards set forth by both federal and state 
law.
10
 The applicable federal law is the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA), while the controlling state laws include the Sherman Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Law (Sherman Law) and the Protection of Human Subjects in 
Medical Experimentation Act (Protection Act).
11
 
A. Federal Law 
In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt signed the first federal drug law in 
United States history: the Pure Food Drugs Act.
12
 The Act prohibited 
misbranded and adulterated foods, drinks, and drugs in interstate commerce.
13
 
The convergence of three political forces catapulted the food and drug 
regulation into Congress’ purview.
14
 First, female activists organized a 
decades-long fight to place pressure on Congress to meet the public demands 
to regulate food and drug production.
15
 Secondly, thanks to journalistic pieces 
like Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle and Samuel Collins Adams’ articles in 
Collier’s magazine, concerns regarding “widespread adulteration of ethical 
drugs as well as . . . food” pressured Congress.
16
 Lastly, Harvey Washington 
Wiley and the Bureau of Chemistry fostered a “multifaceted coalition behind 
food and drug regulation” that helped garner support in Congress for food and 
drug regulation in the form of the Pure Food and Drugs Act.
17
 The Department 
 
10. See generally SENATE COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS, PROFESSIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 159, at 2–3 (June 19, 2015) [hereinafter Senate BPED] (describing the 
applicable laws in California regarding investigational products). “Investigational drugs, biological 
products, and devices” may also be referred to as “experimental product(s)” or “investigational product(s)” 
throughout this article. 
11. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 109875–110040 (West 2015) (containing the 
entire code section for the Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law); see also id. at 2 (describing the 
applicable laws in California regarding investigational products). 
12. See generally Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, FDA 
CONSUMER MAG. (Jan.–Feb. 2006), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Centennialof 
FDA/CentennialEditionofFDAConsumer/ucm093787.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (describing the history of federal drug law in the U.S.). 
13. Id. 
14. Daniel P. Carpenter, Pure Food and Drug Act (1906), ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (2004), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Food_and_Drug_Act_of_1906.aspx (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (describing the history of the Act). 
15. Id. 
16. See generally id. (describing the history of the Act). The Jungle by Upton Sinclair exposed the 
unsanitary practices in the Chicago meat-packing industry. Id. Samuel Collins Adams’ article in Collier’s 
magazine discussed patent medicines and advertising fraud. Id. 
17. Id. 
2016 / Health and Safety 
554 
of Agriculture’s Bureau of Chemistry enforced this Act, which subsequently 
became the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1930.
18
 
1. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 
On June 25, 1938, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which required 
manufacturers to prove the safety of a drug prior to marketing it to the 
public.
19
 Before marketing, the FDCA required drug manufacturers to submit a 
drug’s safety data to the FDA for evaluation.
20
 The FDCA mandated that all 
drug studies utilize “adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to 
show whether or not the drug is safe.”
21
 
In 1961, an Australian obstetrician discovered that a widely prescribed 
drug, thalidomide, was associated with severe birth defects and sometimes 
death.
22
 In Germany, a newspaper reported that 161 babies suffered severe 
birth defects from their mother’s use of thalidomide.
23
 Thanks to the processes 
set forth by the FDCA and FDA inspector Dr. Frances Kelsey,
24
 the 
manufacturer of thalidomide, Merrell,
25
 never marketed thalidomide in the 
 
18. See generally Meadows, supra note 12 (describing the history of federal drug law in the U.S.). 
19. Id. 
20. Suzanne White Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials; A Short History, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm304485.htm (last visited June 22, 
2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“A new provision in the act—requiring drug 
sponsors to submit safety data to FDA officials for evaluation prior to marketing—appeared with relatively 
little discussion following on the heels of the Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster.”); see also Investigational New 
Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Development 
ApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugIN
DApplication/ucm176522.htm (last visited July 7, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (explaining that the FDA requires drug manufacturers to submit safety data that typically includes, 
but not is not limited to, the following: chemistry, manufacturing, and control; samples, methods validation 
package, and labeling; nonclinical pharmacokinetics and bioavailability; microbiology; clinical data; safety 
update report; statistical; case report tabulations; case report forms; patent information; and patent 
certification). 
21. White Junod, supra note 20 (“[T]he law did require that drugs be studied by ‘adequate tests by all 
methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not the drug is safe.’”). 
22. Id. (describing the 1961 thalidomide tragedy); see also Bara Fintel et al., The Thalidomide 
Tragedy: Lessons for Drug Safety and Regulation, HELIX MAG. (July 28, 2009), 
https://helix.northwestern.edu/article/thalidomide-tragedy-lessons-drug-safety-and-regulation (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the thalidomide tragedy). 
23.  Fintel et al., supra note 22. A total of 161 German babies were adversely affected by thalidomide, 
which caused the drug to be banned in Germany, as well as most other countries in which it was previously 
sold. 
24. Id. (“Kelsey felt the application for thalidomide contained incomplete and insufficient data on its 
safety and effectiveness. Among her concerns was the lack of data indicating whether the drug could cross 
the placenta.”). 
25. Frances Oldham Kelsey, Autobiographical Reflections, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/OralHistories/SelectedOralHistoryTranscripts/UCM406132.pdf (last 
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U.S.
26
 The European disaster and Dr. Kelsey’s refusal to approve thalidomide 
bolstered the importance of the FDCA and helped lead to significant 
amendments to the FDCA in the form of the Kefauver-Harris Drug 
Amendments of 1962 (Kefauver-Harris Amendments).
27
 
2. Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of 1962 
The Kefauver-Harris Amendments introduced procedures that improved 
the control over investigational drugs in the U.S.
28
 They required drug 
manufacturers to provide support that their drugs were both safe and effective 
prior to marketing.
29
 
In addition to satisfying the FDCA requirements, manufacturers must also 
provide substantial evidence of the product’s effectiveness for its intended use 
before advertising it.
30
 The FDCA requires manufacturers to provide 
“substantial evidence” of the product’s effectiveness based on “‘adequate and 
well-controlled studies, i.e. clinical trials.”
31
 
Clinical trials involve human volunteers who receive specific 
interventions as prescribed by a research plan or protocol designed by the 
investigating body.
32
 Conducting clinical trials allows investigators “to 
determine the safety and efficacy of the intervention by measuring certain 
 
visited Aug. 6, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Dr. Kelsey described the 
application review process for thalidomide that was submitted by the drug company Merrell for the German 
firm that created thalidomide. Id. 
26. See White Junod, supra note 20 (“Because of the concerns of FDA drug reviewer Dr. Frances 
Kelsey, the drug was never approved for sale in the U.S.”). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. (“The Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments and the 1963 investigational drug regulations 
themselves introduced many new procedures that strengthened control over investigational new drugs in the 
United States.”). 
29. Fintel et al., supra note 22 (“By passing the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments Act in 1962, 
legislators tightened restrictions surrounding the surveillance and approval process for drugs to be sold in 
the U.S., requiring that manufacturers prove they are both safe and effective before they are marketed. 
Now, drug approval can take between eight and twelve years, involving animal testing and tightly regulated 
human clinical trials.”). 
30. See generally Meadows, supra note 12 (providing background regarding the trigger that created 
the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments). 
31. See White Junod, supra note 20 (noting this was a revolutionary requirement). 
32. See Learn About Clinical Studies, U.S. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, 
https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/about-studies/learn (last visited July 7, 2015) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (explaining that interventions may include drugs or devices; procedures; or changes to 
a patient’s behavior and defining “clinical trial”). 
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outcomes in the participants.”
33
 These tested interventions include, but are not 
limited to, new drugs, devices, and innovative therapies.
34
 
Most prominently, the amendments required the FDA to approve the 
marketing application before the manufacturer could market the drug.
35
 
Furthermore, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments allowed the Secretary of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to institute rules of 
investigation
36
 for new drugs and devices and to require manufacturers to 
obtain informed consent from human subjects.
37
 
3. Access to New Investigational Products Outside of Clinical Trials 
If a patient is unable to access an investigational product through a 
clinical trial, he or she may do so under the FDA’s expanded access 
program.
38
 In the 1960s, the FDA began to offer patients access to 
investigational products through the expanded access—also known as 
compassionate use—program so long as they met specific criteria.
39
 By 1987, 
 
33. Id. 
34. Clinical Trials: How They Work; Why Participate, COLUMBIA UNIV. MED. CTR., 
http://columbiasurgery.org/clinical-trials/clinical-trials-how-they-work-why-participate (last visited July 10, 
2015) [hereinafter Clinical Trials] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
35. See Meadows, supra note 12 (describing the 1962 amendments that mandated the requirement of 
approval by the FDA of the marketing application of a drug prior to being marketed the public). 
36. Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. 
(Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ ucm322856.htm (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). The 1962 amendments gave the Secretary authority to require 
manufacturers to prove the effectiveness of drugs pre-marketing and post-marketing the drug, required 
qualified experts to conduct adequate and well-controlled studies to show the evidence of effectiveness, and 
that the human subjects gave their informed consent. Id. 
37. See Meadows, supra note 12 (providing the Secretary of the HHS the ability to establish rules of 
investigation of new drugs which includes the requirement to obtain the informed consent of human 
subjects). 
38. Expanded Access (Compassionate Use), U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/ucm20080392.htm#Investigational_M
edical_Devices (last visited July 10, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
39.  Rebecca Dresser, The “Right to Try” Investigational Drugs: Science and Stories in the Access 
Debate, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (June 2015) (discussing the history of the expanded use program). 
Under expanded access, a patient must meet the following criteria to be eligible: 
[1)] the person’s physician determines that there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative 
therapy available to diagnose, monitor, or treat the person’s disease or condition, and that 
the probable risk to the person from the investigational product is not greater than the 
probable risk from the disease or condition; [2)] FDA determines that there is sufficient 
evidence of the safety and effectiveness of the investigational product to support its use in 
the particular circumstance; [3)] FDA determines that providing the investigational product 
will not interfere with the initiation, conduct, or completion of clinical investigations to 
support marketing approval; and [4)] the sponsor (generally the company developing the 
investigational product for commercial use) or the clinical investigator submits a clinical 
protocol (a document that describes the treatment plan for the patient) that is consistent with 
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the compassionate use program expanded to include terminally ill patients 
who met certain criteria.
40
 Specifically, it required that these patients were 
unable to enroll in clinical trials, had no reasonable treatment alternatives, and 
had their physician submit an application to the FDA requesting treatment 
utilizing investigational products.
41
 
A drug sponsor or treating physician must submit an application to the 
FDA explaining the patient’s terminal illness and why the use of the 
investigational product is justified.
42
 In addition, the expanded use program 
requires a patient’s informed consent, as well as an Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) approval.
43
 Upon approval by the FDA, the FDA will issue a treatment 
protocol or an Investigational New Drug (IND).
44
 Generally, the FDA only 
allows access to an investigational product during Phase III clinical trials, or 
after they are complete.
45
 
The FDA may grant an emergency IND absent a written application as 
long as the physician agrees to submit an expanded access application within 
fifteen business days of the FDA’s initial authorization.
46
 The use of an 
investigational product absent IRB approval is proper if the physician notifies 
the IRB of the emergency expanded use within five business days of 
treatment.
47
 
The FDA does not require the manufacturer of the investigational product 
to grant expanded access.
48
 Manufacturers may turn down a request for a 
number of reasons, like if it is unwilling.
49
 For instance, the manufacturer may 
deny an expanded access request if it is unwilling to release an investigational 
product that has not completed all phases of a clinical trial.
50
 When a 
 
FDA’s statute and applicable regulations for INDs or investigational device exemption 
applications (IDEs), describing the use of the investigational product. 
Expanded Access (Compassionate Use), supra note 38.  
40. Dresser, supra note 39 (discussing the history of the expanded use program). 
41. Id. 
42. 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 (West 2015). 
43. Id. § 312.88. 
44. Id. 
45. Clinical Trials, supra note 34. Phase III clinical trials involve a large group of people, typically 
ranging from 1,000 to 3,000 participants, that help validate the effectiveness, monitor side effects compared 
to other commonly used treatments, and collect other information to improve the safety of a drug or 
treatment. Id. 
46. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., INDIVIDUAL PATIENT EXPANDED ACCESS APPLICATIONS: FORM 
FDA 3926 GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 1, 4 (Feb. 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
47. Id. 
48. Expanded Access (Compassionate Use), supra note 38. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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manufacturer does approve an expanded use request, an eligible patient may 
only be charged for “the direct costs of making [the] drug available.”
51
 
B. California Law 
The California legislature passed the Sherman Law in 1995, allowing the 
California Department of Public Health (CDPH) to regulate the packaging, 
labeling, and advertising of drugs and devices.
52
 The California legislature 
drafted the language of the Sherman Law to mirror that of the FDCA.
53
 The 
Supreme Court of California held in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases that the 
FDCA could not preempt the Sherman Law because Congress had envisioned 
that the states would establish their own requirements so long as they were 
identical to the FDCA.
54
 
The Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation Act 
(Protection Act) also provides guidelines and protections for human subjects 
in clinical experimentations.
55
 Additionally, California’s Health and Safety 
Code provides procedures to properly conduct independent medical reviews 
as well as clinical trials involving human subjects.
56
 
1. Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law 
Article 4 of the Sherman Law sets out parameters for the experimental use 
of drugs.
57
 Before a manufacturer may give an experimental drug to an eligible 
patient, a committee reviews “the [experiment] as a whole, including the 
consent procedures required” by the CDPH for the protection of human 
rights.
58
 
Additionally, the Sherman Law prohibits the sale, delivery, or giving 
away of a new drug or device unless: 1) the CDPH has previously approved 
 
51. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., CHARGING FOR INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS UNDER AN IND – QS & 
AS (GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY) 1, 6, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidance 
ComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM351264.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
52. See generally Senate BPED, supra note 10, at 1–2 (describing the function of the Office for 
Human Research Protection). 
53. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1077, 1095 (Cal. 2008). 
54. Id. 
55. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170–24179.5 (West 2015). 
56. Id. §§ 1370.4–1370.6. 
57. See generally Senate BPED, supra note 10, at 1–2 (explaining the role and responsibilities of the 
Office for Human Research Protection). 
58. HEALTH & SAFETY § 111540. Committees for the protection of human subjects may review and 
approve the experiment and the consent procedures so long as they operate under the authority of the 
federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id. 
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the new drug or device’s applications, and it has not withdrawn, terminated, or 
suspended that approval; or, 2) the FDA has previously approved the device 
or drug’s application, and likewise it has not withdrawn, terminated, or 
suspended its approval.
59
 
2. California Health and Safety Codes §§ 24170-24179.5 
In 1978, the California legislature enacted the Protection Act, which 
provides protections for human subjects involved in medical 
experimentation.
60
 These protections include a bill of rights; informed consent 
procedures and documentation; and specified disclosures which include the 
right of a subject to give or withdraw consent freely and without duress.
61
 A 
court of law will enforce these protections and charge penalties to anyone who 
violates these protections.
62
 
3. California Health and Safety Codes § 1370.4 and § 1370.6 
Under California Health and Safety Code (HSC) § 1370.4, every health 
plan shall provide an external, independent review process to examine the 
plan’s coverage decisions.
63
 More specifically, the HSC requires coverage for 
experimental or investigational therapies for individual enrollees who have a 
life-threatening or seriously debilitating condition.
64
 
Under HSC § 1370.6, every health plan must provide health coverage for 
all routine patient care costs related to the treatment of an enrollee diagnosed 
with cancer and who has been accepted in a FDA-approved cancer clinical 
trial in phases I through IV.
65
 Clinical trials are broken up into a total of four 
phases, with each phase serving a different function.
66
 Phase I clinical trials 
allow researchers to try out a new drug or treatment with a small cohort of 
 
59. Id. § 111550. 
60. Id. § 24170; see also Senate BPED, supra note 10, at 2–3 (describing the applicable California 
law). 
61. HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 24170–24179.5; see generally Senate BPED, supra note 10, at 1–2 
(explaining the types of protections provided by the Protection Act). 
62. See Senate BPED, supra note 10, at 2, ¶ 7 (describing penalties to be imposed by a court that 
finds a violation). 
63. HEALTH & SAFETY § 1370.4. 
64. Id. Additional requirements required by the California Health and Safety Code include a 
certification by the physician of the terminal condition; the physician’s recommendation of the usage of an 
investigational product or treatment; the patient’s denial of coverage for the investigational product; and the 
drug, device, or treatment would ordinarily be covered except the plan’s determination that is 
investigational. Id. 
65. Id. § 1370.6. 
66. Clinical Trials, supra note 34. 
2016 / Health and Safety 
560 
human subjects to determine its safety, its safe dosage range, and identify any 
side effects.
67
 Phase II continues testing the drug or treatment’s effectiveness 
and safety on a larger group of human subjects.
68
 Phase III expands the trial to 
a vastly larger group, continues monitoring the drug or treatment’s 
effectiveness, compares the drugs or treatment to other common treatments, 
and collects data to improve the drug or treatment’s safety.
69
 Lastly, Phase IV 
involves post-marketing studies to evaluate the drug’s risks, benefits, and 
optimal use.
70
 Additionally, the enrollee’s treating physician must first 
conclude that there may be a meaningful benefit before the enrollee may 
participate in the clinical trial.
71
 
C. Federal Judiciary’s Interpretation of the Right to Try 
In 2003, in an effort to expand the availability of investigational drugs, the 
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs (Alliance) 
proposed a new regulation to the FDA that would “make investigational drugs 
available for purchase at the earliest stages of testing.”
72
 The FDA Associate 
Commissioner denied the Alliance’s proposal.
73
 As a result, the Alliance filed 
a lawsuit against the FDA.
74
 
In Alliance’s lawsuit against the FDA, it claimed that terminally ill 
patients had a constitutional due process right to access non-FDA approved 
drugs.
75
 The District Court subsequently dismissed Alliance’s complaint for 
 
67. Id. Phase I generally involves twenty to eighty human subjects. Id. 
68. Id. Phase II generally involves 100–300 human subjects. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.6 (West 2015). 
72. See generally Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, 03-1601 
(RMU), 2004 WL 3777340, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004) (showing the first legal battle between Alliance 
and the FDA regarding access to experimental drugs). 
73. Letter from Peter J. Pitts, Assoc, Comm’r for External Relations, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., to 
Frank Burroughs, Pres., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, (Apr. 25, 2003) (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (rejecting the proposal and serving notice that the FDA 
was not receptive to the idea of allowing the commercial sale of investigative drugs in the early stages of 
testing). 
74. McClellan, 2004 WL 3777340, at *6.  
The letter indicated that “several senior FDA officials have now carefully reviewed and 
considered [the plaintiff’s] concept paper and numerous letters” and that officials had 
“concluded” that the proposal would “upset the appropriate balance [the FDA] is trying to 
maintain.” [Citation.] By rejecting the proposal, the FDA served notice that it was not 
receptive to the idea of allowing the commercial sale of investigative drugs in the early 
stages of testing. 
Id. 
75. See generally id. (describing the first legal battle between the Alliance and the FDA regarding 
access to experimental drugs and the Alliance’s argument that there is a fundamental right of access to 
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failure to state a claim because “[the Court] is bound by the law as it currently 
exists . . . [Alliance] do[es] not invoke a recognized constitutional right and 
the challenged FDA policy is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.”
76
 
Alliance appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals vacated the District 
Court’s holding in October 2005.
77
 A divided Court of Appeals determined 
that “where there are no alternative government-approved treatment 
options . . . access to potentially life-saving investigational new drugs 
determined . . . to be sufficiently safe . . . warrants protection under the Due 
Process Clause.”
78
 
In 2007, an en banc review of the case by the Court of Appeal reversed 
the panel’s decision, holding that terminally ill patients have no fundamental 
right to access investigational drugs under the Due Process Clause.
79
 On 
January 14, 2008, Alliance filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme 
Court, which was denied.
80
 Therefore, the en banc review of the case by the 
Court of Appeal’s decision stands as today’s authority regarding access to 
investigational drugs.
81
 
 
experimental drugs by analogizing it to fundamental privacy rights that are recognized by the Supreme 
Court). 
76. Id. at *12. 
77. Id. at *6 (showing the first legal battle between the Alliance and the FDA regarding access to 
experimental drugs); see Abigail Alliance For Better Access to Developmental Drugs and Washington Leg. 
Found. v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006) on reh’g en banc sub nom. Abigail Alliance 
for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
We conclude, upon applying the Glucksberg analysis and heeding the protected liberty 
interests articulated by the Supreme Court, that where there are no alternative government-
approved treatment options, a terminally ill, mentally competent adult patient’s informed 
access to potentially life-saving investigational new drugs determined by the FDA after Phase 
I trials to be sufficiently safe for expanded human trials warrants protection under the Due 
Process Clause. The prerogative asserted by the FDA—to prevent a terminally ill patient from 
using potentially life-saving medication to which those in Phase II clinical trials have 
access—thus impinges upon an individual liberty deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and 
tradition of self-preservation. 
Id. 
78. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 
701 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
79. Id.; see also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 159, at 5–6 (Apr. 
7, 2015), [hereinafter Assembly Health Analysis] (describing the holding and procedural history of the 
case). 
80. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 552 U.S. 1159 
(2008).  
81.  Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Assembly Health Analysis, supra note 
79, at 5–6 (explaining that with the denial of the Alliance’s petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals 
decision is the latest authority on the topic of the right to access investigational drugs). 
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D. Nationwide “Right to Try” Movement 
In May 2014, Colorado became the first state to pass a Right to Try or 
“Dallas Buyers’ Club” law, allowing terminally ill patients to access 
investigational products that have passed Phase I of a clinical trial.
82
 Since 
May 2014, twenty-four states, including Arizona, Missouri, Louisiana, 
Oregon, Illinois, and Michigan, have passed similar laws giving eligible 
patients the right to try investigational products.
83
 
Most, if not all, of the states have based their Right to Try legislation on 
the model legislation provided by the Goldwater Institute.
84
 The Goldwater 
Institute is a nonprofit organization that developed the Right to Try model bill 
“to protect the fundamental right of people to try to save their own lives.”
85
 
The model bill notably addresses several issues regarding a patient’s use of 
investigative products.
86
 
First, the Goldwater Institute’s model bill would only permit eligible 
patients to access investigational products that have passed manufacturers’ 
Phase I clinical trials.
87
 Second, manufacturers would only provide 
investigational products to eligible patients who have no other available 
treatments.
88
 Third, the manufacturing company has the discretion to decide 
whether to make the investigational product available to an eligible patient.
89
 
Fourth, a physician’s diagnosis of a terminal disease and declaration that the 
investigational product is the patient’s best alternative is required when 
 
82. Patti Parson, Colorado First State to Pass ‘Right to Try,’ or the ‘Dallas Buyers’ Club’ Law, PBS 
NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (May 19, 2014, 2:11 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ rundown/colorado-
first-state-pass-right-try-dallas-buyers-club-law/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); 
see also Dallas Buyers Club, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0790636/synopsis?ref_=ttpl_pl_syn (last 
visited (July 13, 2015) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing a 2013 film that 
told the story of an AIDS patient who obtained non-FDA approved drugs from Mexico in order to treat his 
AIDS symptoms). 
83. See Dresser, supra note 39, at 1640 (describing the states’ progress in developing Right to Try 
legislation); see also Starlee Coleman, Oregon Becomes 24th State to Allow Terminally Ill to Access 
Investigational Medications, GOLDWATER INST., (Aug. 13, 2015) http://goldwaterinstitute.org/ 
en/work/topics/healthcare/right-to-try/medications/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(describing the current movement of Right to Try legislation through the states). 
84. See Parson, supra note 82 (explaining that the Goldwater Institute is a “conservative public policy 
advocacy and research group which has been trying to reduce the FDA’s power”); see also Dresser, supra 
note 39, at 1640 (explaining the goal behind the Goldwater Institute’s model Right to Try bill). 
85. Dresser, supra note 39. 
86. See Richard Cauchi, “Right to Try” Experimental Prescription Drugs State Laws and Legislation 
for 2014 & 2015, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Mar. 31, 2015) (describing the Right to Try model bill 
the Goldwater Institute developed). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
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submitting a patient’s request for access to an investigational product.
90
 Lastly, 
the model legislation requires that eligible patients provide a signed informed 
consent to reduce any legal liabilities of the manufacturers of an 
investigational product.
91
 
III. AB 159 
AB 159 would have provided “eligible patients” a last-ditch effort to treat 
their conditions by using an investigational drug, biological product, or 
device, also known as an investigational product.
92
 AB 159 would have 
permitted an investigational products manufacturer to have complete 
discretion in deciding which eligible patients may use its product.
93
 The bill 
would have permitted manufacturers to provide these products to an eligible 
patient absent any compensation, unless the manufacturer decides to charge 
the patient for the cost of the products.
94
 
In an effort to prevent a complete bypass of the FDA’s current processes 
to access investigational treatments, AB 159 would have provided an explicit 
criterion when defining an “eligible patient.”
95
 Specifically, the bill would 
have changed the definition of an “eligible patient” as one who either has been 
denied participation in the nearest clinical trial to their home or is unfit to 
participate in a clinical trial due to his or her current condition and stage of 
disease.
96
 By including this criterion, AB 159 would have limited eligible 
patients to terminally ill persons who truly have no realistic routes to access 
 
90. Id. at 2. 
91. Id. (describing the Right to Try model bill developed by the Goldwater Institute). 
92. AB 159, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (adding CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 111548.1(b)). “Eligible patient” means: A person to who meets all the following conditions: (1) Has an 
immediately life-threatening disease or condition, (2) Has considered all other treatment options currently 
approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration, (3) Has not been accepted to participate in 
the nearest clinical trial to his or her home for the immediately life-threatening disease or condition 
identified in paragraph (1) within one week of completion of the clinical trial application process, or, in the 
treating physician’s medical judgment, it is unreasonable for the patient to participate in that clinical trial 
due to the patient’s current condition and stage of disease, (4) Has received a recommendation from his or 
her primary physician and a consulting physician for an investigational drug, biological product, or device, 
(5) Has given written informed consent for the use of the investigational drug, biological product, or device, 
or, if he or she lacks the capacity to consent, his or her legally authorized representative has given written 
informed consent on his or her behalf, (6) Has documentation from his or her primary physician and a 
consulting physician attesting that the patient has met the requirements of this subdivision; see also  
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 159, at 6 (Aug. 31, 2015), [hereinafter Senate 
Rules Analysis] (explaining the purpose of AB 159). 
93. Id. at 2. 
94. Id. at 4. 
95.  AB 159, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (adding CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 111548.1(b)(2)–(3)). 
96. Id. 
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investigational drugs.
97
 Additionally, California’s Right to Try law would have 
addressed patient safety concerns regarding the risks of using an 
investigational product by removing its availability if the investigational 
product’s clinical trial was closed due to “lack of efficacy or for toxicity.”
98
 
AB 159 would have added a means to proffer a health benefit plan to 
provide coverage for investigational products but does not require a health 
benefit plan or any state agency to provide coverage for the cost for any 
investigational products.
99
 Additionally, AB 159 would have provided 
important legal protections for all parties involved in the recommendation, 
manufacturing, or administration of the investigational drug, biological 
product, or device to an eligible patient.
100
 
Specifically, AB 159 would have prevented a state regulatory board from 
“revok[ing], fail[ing] to renew, or tak[ing] any other disciplinary action 
against a physician’s license based solely on the physician’s recommendation” 
regarding the use of an investigational product.
101
 Secondly, AB 159 would 
have precluded any state agency from altering any recommendation made to 
the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) regarding a 
health care provider’s certification to participate in CMS because of the health 
care provider’s recommendation to access an investigational product.
102
 
Thirdly, the law would have stated that it “does not create a private cause of 
action against a manufacturer” of investigational products or “against any 
person or entity involved in the care of an eligible patient resulting from the 
investigational products so long as they comply in good faith with the 
provisions of AB 159 and they exercise reasonable care.”
103
 
Lastly, this law would have required the physician’s institutional review 
board to report certain data biannually to the CDPH, the Medical Board of 
 
97. Id. 
98. Id. (adding CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 111548.2(d)). 
 99. “‘Health benefit plan’ means any plan or program that provides, arranges, pays for, or reimburses 
the cost of health benefits. ‘Health benefit plan’ includes, but is not limited to, a health care service plan 
contract issued by a health care service plan, as defined in Section 1345 of this code, and a policy of health 
insurance, as defined in Section 106 of the Insurance Code, issued by a health insurer.” Id. (adding CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §111548.1(c); Section 111548.2(c)(2) states the following: This article does not 
require a health benefit plan to provide coverage for the cost of any investigational drug, biological product, 
or device, or the costs of services related to the use of an investigational drug, biological product, or device 
under this article. A health benefit plan may provide coverage for an investigational drug, biological 
product, or device made available pursuant to this section. Id. (adding CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 111548.2(c)(2)). 
100. See Senate Rules Analysis, supra note 92, at 5–6 (describing the various legal protections 
provided by AB 159). 
101. AB 159, 2015 Leg., 2015–2016 Sess. (Cal. 2015) (adding CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 111548.3(a)). 
102. Id. § 111548.3(c). 
103. Id. §§ 111548.3(d), 111548.5. 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47 
565 
California (MBC), and the Osteopathic Medical Board of California 
(OMBC).
104
 The entities would have received the following information from 
a manufacturer: 1) the number of requests made for the investigational 
product; 2) the status of the requests made; 3) the duration of the 
investigational treatment; 4) all costs paid by the eligible patient for each 
investigational product; 5) the success or failure of the investigational product 
in treating the eligible patient’s terminal illness; and 6) any adverse effects 
from the investigational product.
105
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Assembly Member Ian Calderon and his principal co-author Senator Jeff 
Stone believed the proposed law would have given terminally ill patients the 
ability to have a second chance at life through the use of non-FDA approved 
drugs.
106
 Senator Stone stated, “medical decisions, especially those of terminal 
patients, should be made by doctors and patients, not bureaucrats, and this bill 
ensures that terminal patients have the right to make their own medical 
decisions.”
107
 However, critics of the bill indicated AB 159 was premature and 
would have thwarted the current FDA processes to ensure patient safety and 
protection.
108
 
A. Basis and Benefits of AB 159 
AB 159 was part of a nationwide legislative movement driven by fellow 
state legislatures to allow eligible patients the opportunity to seek out non-
FDA approved investigational treatments that may possibly save their lives.
109
 
Although Alliance may have created the initial spark, the Goldwater 
Institute has led the recent surge of Right to Try legislation.
110
 Like AB 159, 
all states’ Right to Try bills were mostly based off of the Goldwater Institute’s 
 
104. Id. at § 111548.3(b)(1)–(6). 
105. Id.  
106. Ian Calderon and Jeff Stone, Gov. Brown Should Sign AB-159, The “Right to Try” Bill, FOX 
AND HOUNDS DAILY (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.foxandhoundsdaily.com/2015/09/gov-brown-should-
sign-ab-159-the-right-to-try-bill/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
107. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS, PROFESSIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, COMMITTEE 
ANALYSIS OF SB 149 (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/sen/sb_0101-0150/sb_149 
_cfa_20150424_143236_sen_comm.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
108. Jeremy B. White, ‘Right to Try’ Bills Would Let Dying Californians Use Experimental Drugs, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (May 22, 2015), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/article 
21718809.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
109. Supra Part II.D. 
110. Adriance, supra note 1, at 150–51. 
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model legislation.
111
 Advocates of Right to Try legislation characterize it as “a 
boon to personal liberty and a remedy of bureaucratic failure.”
112
 An example 
of this bureaucratic failure is the complexity and time-consuming commitment 
required to fill out the necessary paperwork to submit a formal request for 
expanded access.
113
 A consequence of such an arduous and time-consuming 
process is that it often time prevents eligible patients from even having the 
option to acquire investigational treatment.
114
 The Goldwater Institute’s model 
Right to Try legislation bypasses these delays and provides a shortcut to 
treatment.
115
 
If AB 159 had been chaptered, eligible patients who could not afford to 
wait for a drug to obtain FDA approval or lack the luxury of time to go 
through the motions of an expanded access request would have had the 
opportunity to request experimental treatment directly from the manufacturer 
of the drug.
116
 Requests could have only been made for treatments that has 
passed Phase I of FDA clinical trials.
117
 
AB 159 might have also “promote[d] federal policy reform through the 
FDA or Congress, or [may have] convince[d] federal courts to recognize a 
Right to Try under the Constitution.”
118
 Federalists believe that states are 
“laboratories of democracy,” which are ideal platforms to launch federal 
reforms.
119
 With the growing number of states enacting Right to Try laws, 
federal officials gain insight into how the public has reacted to Right to Try 
laws and how federal officials should respond.
120
 Advocates claim there are 
two advantages that can occur by initiating a policy movement at the state 
level.
121
 First, it grants access to medication to patients in need while 
simultaneously introducing a policy that the nationwide population is not yet 
 
111. Id. Recent Right to Try bills used the Goldwater Institute’s model bill for Right to Try. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Alexander Gaffney, From 100 Hours to 1: FDA Dramatically Simplifies its Compassionate Use 
Process, REGULATORY AFFAIRS PROF’LS SOC’Y (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-
Focus/News/2015/02/04/21243/From-100-Hours-to-1-FDA-Dramatically-Simplifies-its-Compassionate-
Use-Process/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). The current FDA form requires 
twenty-six separate types of information and seven attachments. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Cauchi, supra note 86 (describing the Right to Try model bill developed by the Goldwater 
Institute). 
116. Senate BPED, supra note 10, at 7 (explaining the purpose behind AB 159). 
117. Id. 
118. Adriance, supra note 1, at 149 (describing a different function of Right to Try state laws and 
legislation). 
119. Id. at 155–57 (describing the State Right to Try’s function as a persuasive platform for 
nationwide reform). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
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ready to accept.
122
 Second, it provides a way to generate national attention to 
the policy issue.
123
 By drawing attention to the policy, AB 159 helped garner 
support and increased focus on the political figures backing the movement.
124
 
Despite the Governor’s veto, massive support from legislators and the general 
public strengthened the credibility of the movement and ultimately helped 
increase the policy’s legitimacy by shining light upon it.
125
 
B. Concerns Regarding AB 159 
Despite the national movement towards enacting Right to Try laws, 
opponents and critics
126
 of AB 159 raised a series of issues regarding AB 159 
that swayed Governor Brown to veto the bill.
127
 Concerns ranged from a lack 
of adequate protections for patient safety, AB 159’s prematurity in light of 
recent developments on the federal level in streamlining the FDA’s current 
expanded access program process, a preemption issue between state law and 
the FDA’s regulations, and uncertainties with how AB 159 will affect future 
drug research.
128
 Governor Brown ultimately vetoed the bill on the grounds 
that the new streamlined process provided by the FDA should be given “a 
chance to work” before “authorizing an alternative state pathway.”
129
 
1. Patient Safety 
Critics of AB 159 and other Right to Try laws share a common belief that 
“instead of adopting access rules that expose more terminally ill patients to 
harm and disappointment, ‘the gate to access experimental treatments must be 
closed enough to prevent medical interventions that impose excessive 
 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Supra Part II.D; see also Senate BPED, supra note 10, at 9–10. Opponents of AB 159 included 
the Association of Northern California Oncologists (ANCO), the California Medical Association (CMA), 
the California Nurses Association (CNA), and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA). Id. 
127. See generally Senate BPED, supra note 10, at 9 (providing a summary of concerns from 
opponents of AB 159); see also Joan Koerber-Walker, HCR 2005 – “Right to Try” Won’t Benefit Patients, 
ARIZ. BIOINDUSTRY ASSOC. (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.azbio.org/hcr2005 (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (arguing that the passage of a Right to Try law is ineffective in the face of 
preemption issues). 
128. Id. 
129.  Press Release, Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., Office of the Governor Veto Message for AB 
159 (Oct. 11, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/AB_159_VetoMessage.pdf [hereinafter Press Release, 
Veto Message] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
2016 / Health and Safety 
568 
harm.’”
130
 Opponents state that laws like AB 159 undercut the FDA’s 
authority to provide protective regulation in the best interest of pharmaceutical 
users and ultimately exposes them to unknown dangers due to the limited 
testing an investigational drug goes through in Phase I clinical trials.
131
 
Medical professionals across the country have echoed concerns regarding 
Right to Try laws like AB 159 with respect to how these types of laws may 
ultimately cause more harm than good for eligible patients.
132
 Dr. Paul Helft,
133
 
a professor of Medicine at Indiana University School of Medicine has stated: 
[One,] these are mostly coming out of the illusory thinking that 
meaningful benefit is likely . . . two, these come out of the sense 
there’s nothing to lose, you’re going to die anyway. But there are 
things that you could lose: You might die faster or might spend time 
getting sick from the side effects of the drug.
134
 
The problem stems from the inability to properly inform patients about the 
risks and benefits of investigational drugs that have only have completed 
Phase I clinical trials or are still in the midst of completing Phase I.
135
 Data 
regarding the risks and benefits of a drug during Phase I clinical trials is very 
minimal due to the small number of participants
 
involved at this phase.
136
 As 
such, the threat to patient’s safety was a serious concern with AB 159.
137
 
Furthermore, some terminally ill patients have a hopeless mentality, and 
critics of AB 159 feared that the legislation would have provided such patients 
a way around protections mandated by the FDA.
138
 There is a risk that patients 
with serious illnesses may not fully understand or assess the risks and benefits 
while deciding whether to take an investigational product.
139
 Due to their 
impaired mentality, concerned citizens have characterized terminally ill 
 
130. Dresser, supra note 39, at 1643. 
131. Cauchi, supra note 86, at 2 (summarizing critics arguments against Right to Try bills and laws). 
132. Shari Rudavsky, Legislation Would Allow ‘Right-to-Try’ Trial Drugs, USA TODAY (Feb. 3, 
2015, 6:51 P.M.), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/02/03/legislation-would-allow-right-
to-try-experimental-drugs/22821457/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing 
statements of supporters and opponents of Right to Try legislation). 
133. Id. Dr. Helft also is an oncologist and director of the Charles Warren Fairbanks Center for 
Medical Ethics at IU Health. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. See Austin Winniford, Expanding Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use: A Policy 
Analysis and Legislative Proposal, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 205, 224 (2009) (explaining the risks associated 
with providing investigational drugs that have only completed phase I clinical trials). 
136. Id. at 225. 
137. Id. 
138. See id. (providing an explanation behind the problem with dealing with desperate patients and 
investigational drugs). 
139. Id. 
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patients as “the most vulnerable research subject,” and therefore, preventing 
these types of patients from utilizing the loophole around the FDA’s 
regulatory protections that would have been created by AB 159 is necessary.
140
 
Patients readily see and pursue the slim chance that the drug will provide 
miraculous recovery, but fail to see the inverse of a truly painful reaction and 
hastened death from the drug.
141
 
2. Was AB 159 Even Necessary? 
Opponents of AB 159 proclaimed passing AB 159 would have been 
premature in light of recent developments at the federal level.
142
 In February 
2015, the FDA began streamlining patient access to investigational drugs in 
response to criticism that the process was complex and time-consuming.
143
 
Previously, the FDA reported that it took nearly 100 hours to fill out twenty-
six information fields and seven attachments for the application.
144
 The new 
format is shorter and less complex for physicians to fill out and will only take 
forty-five minutes to complete.
145
 In addition, the FDA has redesigned its 
website to help patients and physicians have a more user-friendly access to 
instructions on how to fill out the new expanded access applications.
146
 
Due to these recent advances in the expanded access arena, the problems 
AB 159 aimed to solve were moot.
147
 By drastically reducing the amount of 
time required to fill out a request application, more patients will be able to 
obtain an answer from the FDA in a more time efficient fashion.
148
 The FDA 
reports it may reply to the majority of expanded access requests, generally 
within days or hours after a request is submitted.
149
 As a result of these recent 
developments by the FDA, if AB 159 had been chaptered, it may have been 
 
140. See id. (explaining the risks associated with providing investigational drugs that have only 
completed Phase I clinical trials). “The most vulnerable research subject” is a term George Annas, a 
bioethicist and law professor, uses to characterize terminally ill patients. Id. 
141. Id. 
142.  Senate BPED, supra note 10, at 9 (stating that the passage of AB 159 may be premature due to 
recent developments on the federal level); see also Gaffney, supra note 113. 
143. Peter Lurie, A Big Step to Help the Patients Most in Need, FDAVOICE, (Feb. 4, 2015), 
http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2015/02/a-big-step-to-help-the-patients-most-in-need/ (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the new streamlined process for expanded access 
requests). 
144. Id. 
145. See id. (describing the benefits of the new streamlined process). 
146. See id. (describing the new website for patients to use). 
147. See generally Gaffney, supra note 113 (explaining the cause for streamlining the compassionate 
use process); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF 
AB 159, at 5 (Apr. 21, 2015) (explaining the purpose behind AB 159). 
148. Lurie, supra note 43 (describing the new streamline process for expanded access requests). 
149. Id. 
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too late.
150
 This criticism was the basis in Governor Brown’s veto of the bill; 
he stated, “Before authorizing an alternative state pathway, we should give 
this federal expedited process a chance to work.”
151
   
Moreover, a drug manufacturer would not have had incentive to accept 
any patient requests for experimental treatment made under AB 159 because it 
may have interfered with its overall goal to gain FDA approval of an 
experimental drug.
152
 The production of experimental drugs for use outside of 
clinical trials is expensive and burdensome.
153
 
If AB 159 had gone into effect and a drug manufacturer had accepted 
patient requests, it would have jeopardized its chances for FDA approval of 
those experimental treatments due to potentially violating the FDCA.
154
 The 
purpose of obtaining FDA approval for drugs is to allow the drug 
manufacturers to “recoup their investment and make a profit, because without 
FDA approval [drug manufacturers] can’t sell the drug.”
155
 
Additionally, manufacturers may still have been at risk of violating the 
FDCA while acting under the authority of AB 159.
156
 To best comply with 
FDA regulations and improve their chances of FDA approval, manufacturers 
would still have needed to seek a patient IND through the FDA’s expanded 
use program.
157
 
3. Preemption Issue 
If AB 159 had been chaptered, its ability to survive a federal preemption 
challenge would have been doubtful.
158
 Federal law already establishes the 
protocols and procedures that a person must take to access non-FDA approved 
 
150. See generally Senate BPED, supra note 10, at 9 (stating that the passage of AB 159 may be 
premature due to recent developments on the federal level). 
151. Press Release, Veto Message, supra note 129. 
152. Dresser, supra note 39, at 1646 (explaining why a drug manufacturer may elect not to accept a 
patient request under a Right to Try law). 
153. See id. at 1646–47 (explaining why a drug manufacturer may elect not to accept a patient request 
under a Right to Try law). 
154. See id. (explaining why a drug manufacturer may elect not to accept a patient request under a 
Right to Try law and that the FDA may cite a violation of the FDCA for any distribution of an unauthorized 
investigational drug). 
155. David Gorski, “Right to Try” Laws and Dallas Buyers’ Club: Great Movie, Terrible for Patients 
and Terrible Policy, SCIENCE-BASED MED. (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.sciencebased medicine.org/right-to-
try-laws-and-dallas-buyers-club-great-movie-terrible-public-policy/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (providing an explanation of why Right to Try laws are terrible policy and bad for 
patients). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. See Koerber-Walker, supra note 127 (arguing that the passage of a Right to Try law is 
ineffective in the face of preemption issues). 
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drugs.
159
 AB 159 would have allowed an eligible patient to attempt to bypass 
the FDA’s protocols and procedures, thus creating a contradiction between 
state law and federal law.
160
 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that the 
“Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land.”
161
 In the past, the Supreme Court held against a finding of 
presumption for the preemptive authority of the FDA in regards to express and 
implied field preemption.
162
 However, in recent years the Supreme Court has 
gradually moved to the opposite end of the spectrum and presumed FDA 
regulation preempts state law.
163
 
The FDA’s evident ability to regulate and monitor the pharmaceutical 
marketplace validates the Supreme Court’s shift in supporting the FDA’s 
preemptive authority as “the best way to ensure the optimal performance of 
the FDA.”
164
 Furthermore, several other federal courts have held that the 
FDA’s “comprehensive regulatory regime governing manufacturing, approval, 
labeling, and distribution of drug products preempts state laws,” and it would 
follow that the FDA would treat Right to Try laws like AB 159 the same.
165
 
Although no preemption challenges have been made against a state’s Right to 
Try law, based on the latest decisions by the Supreme Court regarding the 
FDA’s preemptive authority, AB 159 would not have survived a preemption 
challenge.
166
 
Supporters of laws and bills like AB 159 say “they may [still] serve a 
valuable service in spotlighting the issue.”
167
 Frank Burroughs, founder of 
Alliance, agreed with this idea: “[A lawsuit] wouldn’t be all bad news because 
it would further elevate this issue in the public arena and put pressure on 
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Congress and the FDA to make this change.”
168
 Another lawsuit would 
generate additional momentum for the Right to Try movement, similar to that 
created by Mr. Burrough’s case.
169
  Therefore, even if a Right to Try bill does 
not survive a preemption challenge, the national attention may spark national 
reform.
170
 
4. Hampering Future Drug Research 
Right to Try laws, collectively, may hamper future drug research to the 
detriment of the general populace.
171
 AB 159 could have negatively impacted 
the number of participants for FDA-sponsored clinical trials by allowing 
patients to bypass clinical trials and regulations enforced by the FDA and 
obtain the drug directly.
172
 A recent article by Professor Tony Yang, a 
professor at George Mason’s College of Health and Human Services, stated: 
“state laws could hinder future drug development because they threaten the 
research and approval process.”
173
 
Professor Yang and his colleagues concluded “it is unlikely that state 
Right to Try laws will result in improved access to experimental drugs and 
treatments.”
174
 Instead, Professor Yang explains that Right to Try laws, like 
AB 159, will threaten the structure of the research and approval process set 
forth by the FDA by providing an easier alternative path to experimental 
drugs; making the FDA’s clinical trial process seem more onerous and 
complex compared to the state alternative.
175
 He notes that unlike the 
compassionate use program, collected data is not required to be reported to the 
FDA under Right to Try laws.
176
 In addition to reducing the number of clinical 
trial participants, Right to Try legislation may “hinder subsequent FDA 
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approval” for those drug companies that grant access to eligible patients that 
seek experimental drugs outside of the FDA process.
177
 
Drug companies would have likely found themselves at risk of requiring 
additional resources and money to cope with requests from eligible patients 
under AB 159 who seek experimental treatment “to conduct individualized 
trial programs or increased risks of higher rates of reports of adverse 
effects.”
178
 Higher rates of adverse events could have resulted from eligible 
patients who took drugs through AB 159, had it been enacted, compared to 
other clinical trial patients under the FDA.
179
 Since the FDA requires drug 
companies to report all adverse events that occur during the preapproval 
phase, drug companies may fear that after accepting a patient’s request, that 
obligations under AB 159 would have “reduce[d] the chance of approval [for 
that drug], [led] to additional label warnings, or create[d] negative 
publicity.”
180
 
These risks could have forced a delay in subsequent FDA approval of 
experimental treatments.
181
 In consideration of these concerns, AB 159 would 
have imposed a significant barrier in the advancement of future drug research 
and development.
182
 
C. Was AB 159 Still Worth It? 
Despite the significant concerns that led to AB 159’s downfall, this 
proposed law and others like it may “[leverage] a facet of American 
federalism: that state laws can be used to persuade federal actors.”
183
 The 
public spotlight on the experimental treatment access issue has already 
brought a much-needed renovation to the cumbersome and inefficient 
application and review process of the expanded access program.
184
 Through 
persuasion and influence, federal actors may one day create a federally 
recognized legal Right to Try that both satisfies FDA safety standards and 
does not deter drug companies from participating.
185
 By enacting laws like AB 
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159, states may shine light on the issue as well as apply pressure on the 
federal government and the FDA to make the necessary changes that will 
benefit all parties in the long-term.
186
 
The ball is in the FDA’s court to prove to the states and the public that the 
new streamlined process will remedy the access issues faced by many 
terminally ill patients.
187
 Governor Brown made it clear in his veto message 
that “we should give this federal expedited process a chance to work.”
188
 As of 
early April 2016, it is too soon to tell whether the FDA’s revamped process 
will deliver on its promises to help terminally ill patients access life-saving 
drugs.
189
  
Calderon has already announced that he will “revive the proposal” for the 
next legislative session in a “challenge to the Governor’s [October] veto.”
190
  
Calderon went on to state that, “We were right on the issue.  I think the 
governor was wrong.”
191
 2016 proves to be a very important year for Governor 
Brown and proponents of Right to Try laws.
192
 If the FDA falters in providing 
patients the expedited and streamlined access to experimental drugs, 
Californian patients and their families will have a strong platform to voice 
their dismay.
193
 In response to a potential failure on the part of the FDA, 
Governor Brown will be pressured to sign a future Right to Try bill to appease 
legislators and their supporters.
194
 On the other hand, if reports of successful 
stories by terminally ill patients spread and the new FDA process statistically 
shows that patients have better access to drugs, then the Right to Try 
movement may lose significant steam and its credibility may begin to fade.
195
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The lifespan of AB 159 may have been brief in the face of the Governor’s 
veto, concerns over patient safety, efforts by the FDA to simplify the existing 
process to access experimental drugs, and low survivability of AB 159 in the 
face of a preemption challenge.
196
 Yet, despite the veto and even if federal law 
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had preempted AB 159, its presence, collectively with other states’ Right to 
Try laws and bills, has placed the issue on the national stage for public 
consideration and for federal policymakers to address.
197
 The emergence of 
stories like Abigail Burroughs’ emphasizes the personal nature of the issues 
and strengthens the Right to Try movement.
198
 
In light of the veto, the Goldwater institute believes the Governor’s veto 
reasoning “actually bolsters the supporters’ cause.”
199
 By deferring the issue to 
the FDA and stating that the new process should be given “a chance to work,” 
the Governor’s veto provides another example of bureaucratic failure and why 
a Right to Try law is necessary.
200
 This “wait-and-see” approach by the 
Governor is a serious gamble of the lives of those terminally ill Californians 
that were looking forward to the enactment of AB 159.
201
  If the FDA’s new 
streamlined process proves to be a success then the Right to Try movement 
will lose some of its momentum and may even lose legislative support in 
California in the future.
202
  If the gamble doesn’t pay off and the FDA’s 
streamlined process fails to meet the public’s hopes and expectations, then 
Right to Try supporters, such as Calderon, will obtain a formidable platform 
to reinvigorate the Right to Try movement here in California to pressure the 
Governor into signing a Right to Try law for 2017.
203
  In the future, AB 159 
may be credited as a contributing factor in recognizing a Right to Try 
investigational drugs in California.
204
 
 
197. Id.; Ollove, supra note 167. 
198. Burroughs, supra note 3, see also Coleman, supra note 83. 
199. Mason, supra note 190. 
200. Id.; supra Part IV. 
201. Supra Part IV. 
202. Id.  
203. Id. 
204. See id. (explaining the possible future of a legal Right to Try experimental drugs). 
